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TO WHOM DOES A NEW USE BELONG?: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE NEW USE DOCTRINE AND THE PROTECTION IT
AFFORDS AFTER RANDOM HOUSE V. ROSETTABOOKS*
The decision in Random House v. RosettaBooks has the potential to transform
the publishing industry and the licensing agreements so commonly relied upon.
Courts have attempted to reconcile application ofthe new use doctrine for decades,
and yet with every conceived new use there isanother interpretation of the rules of
the copyright game. In this Note, the author examines the Random House decision
in light of the New Use Doctrine and proposes contract-based solutions to new use
issues that may avoid the uncertainty of the doctrine as it currently stands.

New uses for old works have always been constitutionally protected under the
Copyright Clause. Unless the rights to a new use are granted to another party, the
creator of the original work maintains the breadth of rights in that use. The dilemma
courts face today is determining when those rights have been contractually granted
to another party and when they still belong to the creator of the work.
This Note examines current New Use Doctrine interpretation in light of the
recent new use case law in the publishing industry, particularly Random House, Inc.
v. Rosetta Books LLC,' and provides suggested revisions to the standard publishing
contract. Part I of this Note reviews the law and policy of the Copyright Clause and
the protection afforded by the Copyright Act. Part IIprovides an examination of the
New Use Doctrine, the two primary approaches to the doctrine, and its historical
application. Part III discusses the Random House decision and its relationship to the
historical application of the New Use Doctrine. Part IV reviews two other recent
new use cases in the publishing industry - Tasini v. New York Times and
Greenberg v. National Geographic - and discusses the impact this line of decisions

will have on the publishing industry. Finally, Part VI discusses some proposed
contract-based solutions for the publishing industry that will avoid the problems
faced by Random House, the New York Times, and National Geographic.
I. COPYRIGHT LAW AND POLICY

"To promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing for limited Times to

I would like to thank Lionel Sobel for bringing this case to my attention. I would also
like to thank Keith Pietropaolo for his enduring support. An earlier version of this Note
placed first in ASCAP's 2003 Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition.
150 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff'dper curiam, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002).
*
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Authors.. . the exclusive Right to their respective Writings....",2
Copyright protection is afforded in the U.S. Constitution by the above clause.
The purpose of the Copyright Clause is to provide the necessary incentive for
authors to create new works by promising that certain rights inherent in those works
will be protected in their name.' The Copyright Act of 1976' was enacted to protect
these rights, which include the exclusive rights of: (1) reproduction; (2) creation of
derivative works; (3) distribution; (4) public performance; (5) public display; and
(6) digital audio transmission.'
The policy of the Copyright Clause is to strike a balance between the creator's
rights in his work and the desire for that work to be available to the public. By
protecting certain intrinsic rights in the creator, that creator is more likely to allow
access to his work. Following this reasoning, the goal of a court deciding a new use
issue is to reach a decision that respects both the law of contracts and the policy of
making the creator's work available for public consumption.
"[E]lectronic information has been a very lucrative endeavor for all players
[(authors, publishers, and consumers)]." 6 As observed by another author in this area
of law, each player, however, has its own concept of whom the Copyright Clause
and Copyright Act were intended to protect.7 Authors "generally . . . [view
copyright] as a means to protect [them] from those who would steal their work and
use it for profit .... For publishers, copyright is used as a means to disseminate
their works in a commercial setting."' Consumers deem copyright as a guarantee
of "easy access" to quality information.9 The reality is that the interest of each party
is dependent upon the interests of others.'" Without incentive for the authors to
create, there would be nothing new and original for publishers to disseminate to
consumers seeking new information. t"
The difficulty of copyright law is the impossibility of striking a perfect balance
between the often competing interests of the parties. 2 New uses for old works and
the policy of copyright law make achieving this balance all the more complicated
2

U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl. 8.

' See MELVILLE E. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A]

(2001).
4 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2598 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2000)).
5 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
6 Doam F. Atteritano, Note, The Growing FinancialPie of Online Publication:Tasini's
New-Use Analysis Leaves FreelanceAuthors Less Than Crumbs, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377,
378, 381 (1998).
7 See id. at 381-83.
' Id. at 381-82; see also id. 381 n.24.
9 Id. at 382.
10 Id. at 383.
Seeid.
,2 See id. at381-83.
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because the parties - the creator of the new use, the owner of the rights to the old
work, the creator of the old work, and the consumer - have increasing investments
in their efforts over time. Further compromising the balance is the fact that the
questions raised by such issues are novel, often presented to a court for the first
time. Such questions concern new technology with which only a small percentage
of the population is familiar and qualified to express reliable opinions. It is under
such circumstances thatjudges are relied upon to make determinations regarding the
ownership of potential technology.
II. NEW USE DOCTRINE AND APPLICATION
A. The Doctrine
"New Use" in the publishing industry refers to rights in "forms of reproduction
and distributions, and methods of exploitation" not in existence or developed at the
time of licensing. 3 The New Use of a work becomes a problematic issue when the
work's creator licenses certain related rights to another party and then at some point
in the future seeks to benefit from the new use for his work under the very rights he
had previously licensed. "Although . . .new media provide new methods of
information distribution, they also create conflicts over the ownership of the content
14
distributed and represent the source of publishing's 'most bitter battle in years.',"
An example of such a conflict is when Author writes a book and grants all
distribution rights to that book to Publisher A. At the time of such grant, there
existed only one way to distribute the book - by sale of hard or softcover paper
versions of the original manuscript. Twenty years after the grant of distribution
rights, Publisher B enters the picture. It has developed a new method of distributing
books that does not use paper at all. Publisher B's method is entirely different from
the distribution envisioned at the time of the grant. Author agrees to grant Publisher
B the right to distribute his work by the new method. Author and Publisher B
reason that the original grant to Publisher A included only the right to distribute his
work in paper format, not by the new method. Publisher A, however, believes that
Author granted such rights to it in the original agreement. This is where the New
Use Doctrine is needed to resolve questions regarding what uses were or were not
included in the original grant of rights.

'3

NIMMER, supra

note 3, § 26.02[B], at 26-9.

Sidney A. Rosenzweig, Comment, Don't Put My Article Online!: Extending
Copyright'sNew- Use Doctrineto the ElectronicPublishingMedia andBeyond, 143 U. PA.
L. REv. 899,900 (1995) (quoting Deidre Carmody, Writers FightforElectronicRights, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 1994, at B20).
"
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B. Two Approaches to the New Use Doctrine
Professor Nimmer identified two approaches to new use analysis. Nimmer
refers to the approaches as "preferred" and "strict."' 5 The strict approach requires
that, unless a new use right is explicitly granted, the right is reserved in the
copyright owner.' 6 This is a conservative approach and tends to favor the grantor
over the grantee by employing a narrow method of contract interpretation.
Alternatively, the preferred approach is the standard relied upon by several
courts.' 7 It provides that rights to a new use will be granted if the rights "may
reasonably be said to fall within the medium as described in the license.""'
Professor Nimmer explains that, under the preferred approach, rights that are within
the ambiguous penumbra are necessarily granted as well those rights clearly
provided for because, in order to be ambiguous, the grant of the right must be a
reasonable conclusion. 9 The preferred approach is a liberal approach and may be
used to interpret contracts in favor of the grantee over the grantor.
C. HistoricalApplication of the New Use Doctrine
The motion picture and television industries were among the first faced with the
new use dilemma.2" The question for these industries was whether grants of motion
picture rights also included the right to television broadcast rights."
Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.22 is the defining case for new use
litigation. Bartsch, represented by his widow, was the owner of the copyright to the
musical Wie Einst in Mai or Maytime.23 He licensed the motion picture rights to the
musical to Warner Brothers Pictures, who subsequently granted the rights to the
defendant. 4 The defendant then began broadcasting the motion picture via
television - the act that brought the suit to litigation.25 The plaintiff argued that the
See NIMMER, supra note 3, § 10.10[B], at 10-90 to 10-91. Professor Nimmer
acknowledges that the two ipproaches to new use analysis apply when private negotiation
cannot resolve the dispute amicably. Often the application of the New Use Doctrine by the
courts is preceded and followed by private party negotiations. The court's role in the dispute
serves the purpose of shedding light on the issues. The parties may then revise the court's
determinations to best serve the intent and purpose of the original contract. See id.
15

16

id.

Atteritano, supra note 6, at 385.
NIMMER, supra note 3, § 10.1 0[B], at 10-90.
19 Id.
20d.
§ 10. 10[B], at 10-85.
2I Id. § 10.10[B], at 10-85 to 10-86.
22 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968).
23 Id. at 151.
24 Id. at 151-52.
25 Id. at 152.
'7

'8
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defendant never received the television broadcast rights and that it would have been
impossible for them to have ever been granted to the defendants. The plaintiff
pointed to the fact that the language of the grant of rights from Bartsch to Warner
Brothers roughly mirrored the language of the grant from the original authors to
Bartsch.26 In other words, Bartsch could only grant to Warner Brothers those rights
that he had received from the original authors. As Bartsch did not have the
television rights from the original grant, regardless of how broad the grant language
was, he could not have licensed such rights to any other party. 2
Second, the plaintiff argued that there was no intent by either party for Warner
Brothers to possess the television rights. She offered evidence that other Warner
Brothers license agreements provided for specific reservation or grant of television
rights.2" These grants indicated Warner Brothers's knowledge of the new media and
its standard operating procedure when seeking rights to that media. Because such
a request was not made, the plaintiff argued that it would be improper to find that
the rights were ever considered with the original grant. The court reasoned away the
second argument as either a strategy of the defendant when the license was drafted
- that is, the defendant intentionally did not mention the television rights so as not
to risk losing them by a specific reservation of the grantor - or as an oversight due
to the fact that the agreement so closely recited the original grant.29 The court then
implemented what has become the defining test for questions of new use. The test
resembles the two approaches Professor Nimmer had identified earlier - the strict
and the preferred.
There are two ways to consider the issue under this test:- either as a
determination of whether the terms of the grant are unambiguous and therefore a
clear expression of intent," or as a fairness and broadness consideration."' The
second approach takes into consideration factors of contract interpretation designed
to result in fairness. Each approach has as its goal fairness for all interested parties.
The first approach relates back to the strict approach to new use analysis as
described by Professor Nimmer, and "includes only such uses as fall within the
unambiguous core meaning of the term .. and exclude[s] any uses that lie within
the ambiguous penumbra."32 Due to the fact that contract interpretation relies on the
Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 151-53.
Bartsch did not obtain the television rights from the original authors until after he
licensed all of his rights to the work to Warner Brothers; therefore, it was not possible for
him to grant what he did not have. Id.
26
27

28
29

Id. at
Id. at

154.
154-55.

Id.at 155; see also Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145
F.3d 481, 486-87 (2d Cir. 1998).
"' Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155; see also Boosey, 145 F.3d at 486-87; NIMMER, supra note
3, § 10.10[B], at 10-89 to 10-91.
32 Boosey, 145 F.3d at 486 (quoting NIMMER, supra note 3, § 10.1 0[B], at 10-90).
3
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intent of the parties at the time of contracting, these "uses . . . within the
unambiguous core meaning" must be unambiguous at the time of contracting."
How does one determine where a new use falls unless it was a contemplated use at
the time of contracting? "[l]ntent is not likely to be helpful when the subject of the
inquiry is something the parties were not thinking about."34 When applying the
strict approach, in order to grant an unknown new use to a party, the owner must
have intended to grant the right to all new uses.
A second problem with applying the strict approach is the determination of the
ambiguity of the language. In Bloom v. Hearst Entertainment, Inc.," ambiguity was
defined as a term that "is susceptible to 'more than one meaning when viewed
objectively by a reasonably intelligent person who has examined the context of the
entire integrated agreement and who is cognizant of the customs, practices, usages
and terminology as generally understood in the particular trade or business. '
While extrinsic evidence is permitted to make the determination of whether a term
is ambiguous, how can a determination be made that a term had a certain meaning
for a particular trade or business if the meaning of that term came into existence
after the time of contracting?37
The Bartsch court, deliberating in 1968, agreed with Professor Nimmer and
opted for the more liberally construed preferred approach to new use analysis.38 The
rule established by Bartsch was that the burden is on the grantor to reserve any new
use right that may be construed to fall within the broad grant of rights and that was
foreseeable at the time of granting.39 In other words, the Bartsch court reasoned
that, if the original grant of rights was unintentionally broad, it was the duty of the
grantor to note and remedy that by reserving or limiting specific rights in their
interest. The Bartsch approach disregards considerations of whether the new use
right falls within the "unambiguous core meaning of the term" as opposed to the
excludable rights which fall within the "ambiguous penumbra."4' Rather, the
Bartsch approach favors the view that accepts that "the licensee may properly
33

Id

SId. at

488 (citing NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 10.10[B], at 10-90).
33 F.3d 518 (5th Cir. 1994).
Id.at 522 (quoting Walk-In Med Ctrs., Inc. v. BreuerCapitalCorp., 818 F.2d 260,263
(2d Cir. 1987)).
"' An example of the difficulties inherent in the strict approach is Bourne v. Walt Disney
Co., 68 F.3d 621 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1240 (1996). There the court also
embarked on the never-ending and complicated debate of whether certain video cassette
rights were "unambiguous" and "fell within the core meaning of the term." See generally
NIMMER, supra note 3, § 10.10[B]. Once again, the court found itself trapped in a debate as
to the intent of the parties to grant rights that there was little or no evidence that they had
ever contemplated.
38 Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155; see also NIMMER, supra note 3, § 10.10[B].
'9 Bloom, 33 F.3d at 525 (citing Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155).
40 Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155.
"
36
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pursue any uses which may reasonably be said to fall within the medium as
described in the license."' The Bartsch court arrived at this conclusion on the rule
that, "[i]f the words are broad enough to cover the new use, it seems fairer that the
burden of framing and negotiating an exception should fall on the grantor."4
The result of taking this broader interpretation of the new use standard is that
there is now "a single person who can make the copyrighted work available to the
public. . . ,whereas the narrower [interpretation] involves the risk that a deadlock
between the grantor and the grantee might prevent the work's being shown over the
' This relates back
new medium at all."43
to the purpose of the Copyright Act and the
Copyright Clause: to ensure that new writings and discoveries are made available
to the public so as to encourage and inspire additional research and creativity."
Under Bartsch, placing this burden on the party most interested in protecting those
enumerated rights - the copyright owner - most effectively upholds the policy of
copyright protection. By placing the burden on the copyright owner, the court
devised a predictable means of deciding new use cases while also encouraging new
developments and uses for such works. The rule established by Bartsch is:
[W]hen a broad grant of rights is made in a contract, and a new use can
be construed to fall within that grant, and that use was foreseeable at the
time the grant was made, then the burden shall be on the grantor to
45
reserve the right to the new, but foreseeable, use.
Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers,Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co.,46 thirty years later,
also considered the two approaches to new use analysis. 47 Boosey upheld the
Bartsch approach and found that the right to a new use should be granted to the
contracting party if it is within the ambiguous penumbra of the contract language.48
However, the Boosey court disagreed with Bartsch's placement of the burden upon
the original copyright owner.
In Boosey the new use issue was the use of a musical composition licensed for
49 The license issued
Disney's motion picture Fantasia.
by the plaintiff granted the
defendant "the nonexclusive, irrevocable right, license, privilege and authority to
record in any manner, medium or form, and to license the performance of, the

41

Id.

42

Id.

43

id.

4 See supranotes 2-12 and accompanying text.
41 Bloom, 33 F.3d at 525 (citing Bartsch, 391 F.2d
46 145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998).
41 Id.at 486-87.
41

49

Id. at 487.
Id.at 483-85.

at 155).
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musical composition hereinbelow set out."5 The license then went on to specify
how the work could be used in relation to the motion picture." The plaintiff - the
copyright owner - argued that, when he licensed the rights to use of his
composition in the motion picture, he did not license the right to use that
composition for video cassette or laser disc versions of the production. 52 The court
addressed both approaches and then applied the more liberal new use approach. It
ruled that the right to distribute the production, including the musical composition,
in video format was "reasonably . . .within the medium as described in the
license." 3
The court disagreed, however, with what had been interpreted to be the default
rule advocated by Bartsch that automatically placed the greater burden on the
copyright owner. The Boosey court relied on "neutral principles of contract
interpretation rather than solicitude for either party" and ruled that a reasonable
reading of the contract should afford protection to the appropriate parties. 54 Based
on the facts presented, however, the court concluded as it had in Bartsch, "that [as
in Bartsch,] the burden fell on [the plaintiff], if he wished to exclude new markets
arising from subsequently developed motion picture technology, to insert such
language of limitation in the license, rather than on [the defendant] to add language
that reiterated what the license already stated. 5 5
There are two ways to consider a new use issue under the Bartsch test: either as
a determination of whether the terms of the grant are unambiguous and therefore a
clear expression of intent; or as a fairness and broadness consideration." Bartsch
and Boosey came to the conclusion that the grantor of the rights bore a greater
burden in protecting the new use rights than the grantee. Random House appears to
follow this conclusion. The question now becomes whether the court in reaching
this conclusion correctly applied the tests established by Bartsch and affirmed by
Boosey.
Ill. RANDOM HOUSE, INC. V. ROSETFABOOKS LLC
"The lawsuit is all about the future, and the potential for ebooks that has yet to
be realized ....58
50

Id. at 484 (quoting the 1939 licensing agreement).

s

Id.

52 Boosey, 145 F.3d at 483-84.
5I Id.at 486 (quoting Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155).
14 Id.
at 487.

55 Id.
56 Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 154-55; see also Boosey, 145
F.3d at 486-87.
s7 Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155; see also Boosey, 145 F.3d at 487; NIMMER, supra note 3, §

10.10[B], at 10-91.
5" David Streitfeld, Ebooks Solving a Problem Consumers Don't Have, CHI. TRIB., Aug.
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This lawsuit began when Random House, Inc., a well-established and respected
publishing house, filed a complaint against RosettaBooks LLC, a young upstart
electronic publisher, alleging copyright infringement and tortious interference with
contracts. 9 The contracts at issue were electronic book (ebook) publishing
agreements entered into with three authors currently under contract with Random
House. Random House sought to enjoin RosettaBooks from selling the works of
these authors. It argued that "the authors of the works had previously granted
[them] - not RosettaBooks - the right to 'print, publish and sell the work[s] in
book form."' Due to the fact that the agreements at issue grant Random House,
among other pertinent provisions, the exclusive right to publish works "in book
form," the ultimate determining issue of this case was whether or not an ebook falls
within the definition of"in book form."
RosettaBooks argued that it had not infringed upon the rights of Random House
because the "licensing agreements between the publisher and the author[s] do not
include a grant of digital or electronic rights."6'
The district court denied Random House's request for a preliminary injunction.
To establish a right to such an injunction, the complaining party must demonstrate
that it has suffered irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on the merits of its
action, or "sufficiently serious questions about the merits to make them a fair ground
for litigation."62 Judge Stein, writing for the district court, ruled that a preliminary
injunction was inappropriate because Random House was not likely to succeed on
the merits of its claim,63 had failed to demonstrate irreparable harm,64 and had not
established that an ebook is a book for the purposes of these publishing contracts. 65
"[This] lawsuit could have important consequences for the publishing industry.
A central issue [was] whether authors of older books own the right to publish their
works electronically, or whether publishers of the original hardcover versions do."'

9,2001, at NI.
" Complaint at 1-2, Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (No. 01 CIV. 1728), availableat http://www.rosettabooks.com/casedocs/
RH Complaint.pdf.
60 Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y.
2001), aff'dper curiam, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002).
61 Id.
at 614.
62 Id. at617.
63 Id.
64 Id.at 624.
63 Id. at 613.
6 Random House Seeks Ban on Copying by E-book Firm Publishing: Styron, Vonnegut
are Among Authors RosettaBooks Says Have OKd Digital Versions, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28,
2001, at C5.
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A. Defining the Electronic Book
The publishing industry is faced with a minor phenomenon known as the
electronic book, or "ebook." This involves delivering an electronic copy of a book
to the consumer rather than the traditional paper copy.67 The technology is a digital
replica of the traditional printed text. "Ebooks are 'digital book[s] that you can read
on a computer screen or an electronic device."' 8 They include a "book cover, title
page, copyright page and 'eforward."' 69 The ebooks sold by RosettaBooks also
contain additional features, such as the ability to highlight and bookmark pages
much as you would in a standard word-processing program."
The public consensus is that the ebook's potential will never come to pass.7
"'The e-book is a ridiculous idea,' said Vonnegut [one of the writers whose work
is being fought over], who hasn't read his work on a computer and never intends
to."72 The attempt by the publishing industry to "turn electronic fiction and nonfiction into a lucrative revenue stream have yielded only a trickle of customers" thus
far.73 It is for precisely this reason that Random House has yet to invest a larger
portion of its resources into developing this modern distribution channel.74
So why was RosettaBooks so willing to embrace this new technology and wage
battle with a large and influential publishing house like Random House? It could
be argued that RosettaBooks intentionally entered into dangerous territory with this
legal battle with the hope of inciting a fight and gaining the ensuing publicity.75 As
a step toward becoming The Ebook Publisher, it took the opportunity this lawsuit
provided and used it to its advantage. At the time of this writing, a Lexis-Nexis
search of major national and international newspapers and magazines citing
"RosettaBooks" resulted in over one hundred articles.76 Only one of those articles
Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 614-15.
Id. (citing RosettaBooks, About eBooks (2002), at http://www.rosettabooks.com/
pages/aboutebooks.html).
69 Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 615.
70 Deposition of Leo D. Dwyer at 70-76, Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC,
150 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (No. 01 CIV. 1728) [hereinafter Dwyer Deposition],
available at http://www.rosettabooks.com/casedocs/DwyerDeposition.pdf.
71 Streitfeld, supra note 58, at NI.
67

68

72 id.
73 Id.

" See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction
at 4, Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (No.
01 CIV. 1728), available at http://www.rosettabooks.com/casedocs/RHSupport.pdf.
71See generally Appellant's Brief at 19-21, Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC,
283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002) (No. 01-7912), available at http://www.rosettabooks.com/
casedocs/Random%'20House%'20BrieP/20on %20Appeal.pd f.
76 E.g., David Goldberg & Robert
J. Bernstein, Are Electronic Books "Books"?,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 21, 200 1, at 3; Brenda Sandburg, No Final Chapter on Authors and Online
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referenced RosettaBooks outside the context of this lawsuit." In addition,
RosettaBooks included on its web site all court documents filed by both parties."'
An alternative reason for the RosettaBooks battle with Random House is that
RosettaBooks continued to fight simply because it believed it had valid contracts
with the authors and sought to reap whatever rewards those contracts may bring.79
If the ebook has no future, why did the authors sign contracts granting the rights
to a publisher other than Random House? The authors may have entered into these
contracts for one of three prominent reasons. First, RosettaBooks promised a greater
percentage of the sales profits to the authors as a way of enticing them to grant
electronic publishing rights.8" Second, some authors may have seen this as an
opportunity to make a statement and rebel against the commercial publishing
industry.8 Finally, the authors may have agreed to enter into ebook contracts with
RosettaBooks because it had already dedicated itself to an electronic distribution
network, while Random House took much more cautious steps toward such an
investment.8 2
B. The Standard Publishing Contract
Random House has been credited with the creation of the "standard publishing
contract" for the publishing industry." Some standard provisions for such contracts
are a grant of rights to the publisher and a non-compete clause by the author. The
author may reserve rights by crossing them out or striking them from the form
Postings, BROWARD DAILY Bus. REv., July 23, 2001, at Al; Elizabeth Sanger, Publishers
Get in on E-Book Debate, NEWSDAY, May 9, 2001, at A46.
" Calvin Reid, RosettaBooks to Bloom by Spring,PUBLISHERS WKLY., Feb. 5,2001, at
33.
78 See RosettaBooks - Legal, at http://www.rosettabooks.com/pages/legal.html (last
visited Mar. 1, 2003) (providing pdf files of court documents filed by Random House and
RosettaBooks in the matter of Random House v. RosettaBooks).
" Answer of Rosetta Books LLC and Arthur M. Klebanoff to the Complaint of Random
House, Inc., Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (No. 01 CIV. 1728) [hereinafter Answer], available at http://www.rosettabooks.com/
casedocs/RBAnswer.pdf.
'0 According to the Random House Brief, however, this is not true. Random House has
developed an ebook program. Appellant's Brief, supra note 75, at 12.
81 Just as independent booksellers have a place in every booklover's heart, the small
upstart ebook publisher is a more romantic image than that of the large corporate publisher
with its big Manhattan office and carefully guarded appointment calendar.
82 This also does not appear to be true according to the Random House Brief. See
Appellant's Brief, supra note 75, at 12 (stating that Random House is ready and willing to
sell ebooks but that there is not a market for them yet).
83 NIMMER,supra note 3, §26.03, Form 26-2. For standard Random House book contract
used during the time period at issue, 1960-1970, see CAROLINE RAND HERRON, A WRITER'S
GUIDE TO COPYRIGHT 44 (1979). This provision is often referred to as the "Grant of Rights."
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contract language. Any rights not specifically provided for by the terms of the
contract are also reserved to the author. While contract interpretation does vary
according to the court, s4 the industry custom is to follow the above rules of
construction.
One of the standard provisions is a grant of publication rights similar to the
following: "The author grants to the Publisher during the term of copyright,
including renewals and extensions thereof. . . [e]xclusive right in the English
language, in the United States of America, .. . to ; . . [p]rint, publish and sell the
work in book form ... ."' A second common element of the publishing contract

is a non-compete clause such as: "The Author agrees that during the term of this
agreement he will not, without the written permission of the Publisher, publish or
permit to be published any material, in book or pamphlet form, based on material
in the work.""6 Another element is the following artistic freedom of the publisher
clause: "[T]he Publisher shall publish the work at its own expense, in such style and
manner, under such imprint and at such price as it deems suitable.""7
The policy of these contracts isto protect the investment of the publisher. While
both the author and the publisher clearly benefit from the license to publish, the
publisher bears most, if not all, of the risk. Inrecognition of that risk, these licenses
are drafted to grant the publisher the greatest array of publication rights available.
C. The Random House PublishingContracts

Random House, with minor variations, uses the standard author/publisher
contract relied on in the publishing industry. 8 Each contract uses the phrase,
"'print, publish and sell the work in book form' to convey rights from the author to
the publisher." 9 The grant of rights portion of the contract enumerates several
different rights that may be granted to Random House or reserved by the authors."
Some of these rights include foreign language or distribution rights, and book club
or anthology publication rights, dramatic and motion picture rights.9 ' The contracts
also provide that, during the term of the agreement, "the Author... will not publish
or permit to be published any edition, adaptation or abridgment of the Work by any

85

For further discussion of contract interpretation, see infra Part III.
HERRON, supra note 83, at 44.

86

Id. at 45.

87

Id.

84

See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
89 Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 615; see also Affidavit of Richard Sarnoff, Random
House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 200 1)(No. 01 CIV. 1728)
88

[hereinafter Samoff Affidavit], available at http://www.rosettabooks.com/casedocs/
RH_Samoff.pdf.

supranote 83, at 44.
Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 615-17.

90 HERRON,
9
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party other than [Random House] without [Random House's] prior written
consent. 92
The two Random House agreements with William Styron were entered into in
1961 and 1977 and granted Random House the right to publish The Confessions of
Nat Turner and Sophie's Choice.93 Although Styron retained foreign publishing
rights, he granted Random House rights to the original publication and licensing for
subsequent publication. He also agreed to a non-compete clause. 94 The noncompete clause provided:
[T]he Author agrees that during the term of this agreement he will not,
without the written permission of the Publisher, publish or permit to be
published any material in book or pamphlet form, based on the material
in the work, or which is reasonably likely to injure its sale. 95
In 1967 and 1970, Kurt Vonnegut entered into contracts with Random House's
predecessor-in-interest, Dell Publishing Co., granting licenses to publish
Slaughterhouse Five, Breakfast of Champions, The Sirens of Titan, Cat's Cradle,
and Player Piano." Among the rights granted by these contracts were the
"exclusive right to publish and to license the Work for publication, after book
publication . . . in anthologies, selections, digests, abridgements, magazine
condensations, serialization, newspaper syndication, picture book versions,
microfilming, Xerox and other forms of copying, either now in use or hereafter
developed."97' These contracts also provide a non-compete clause similar to that
used in the Styron agreement.9"
Robert Parker entered into a 1982 contract with Dell Publishing and granted the
license to publish PromisedLand. Parker's 1982 agreement with Dell was similar
to the 1970 Vonnegut contract, including the non-compete clause."

Ill. AN

ANALYSIS OF THE RANDOM HOUSE DECISION

"[C]an contracts signed in the pre-Internet era ever cover digitized material?"'
92

Id. at 616.

9' Id. at 615-16; see also Appellant's Brief, supra note 75, at 12.

4 Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 615-16; see also Appellant's Brief, supra note 75,
at 12.
9 Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 616 (quoting Sarnoff Affidavit, supra note 89, at
8).
96

Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 616.

Id.
9' Id. at 617 (citing Sarnoff Affidavit, supra note 89, at 8).
97

99

Id.

0 Sandburg, supra note 76.
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Random House argued that the combination of the grant of publication rights and
acceptance of the non-compete clause prevents the authors from ever granting ebook
publication rights to RosettaBooks or any third party.'' If RosettaBooks were to
publish the manuscripts of these authors as ebooks, in book form, they would
infringe upon the rights granted to Random House. And were the authors to permit
RosettaBooks to use their manuscripts in such a manner, they would violate their
non-compete clauses by publishing an "adaptation" of the work."°2
RosettaBooks' simple response to the point asserted by Random House was that,
if"in book form" was such a general grant of all plausible publication rights, why
must the contract then enumerate so many separate, but seemingly included,
rights?0 3 The fact that the publishing contract does enumerate each individually or
potentially granted right implies that any rights not stated in the contract are
reserved by the author. The non-compete clause was addressed in similar fashion
because it protects Random House from competition by another party only within
the realm of those granted rights."° The applicability of the non-compete clause is
limited to those rights initially granted in paragraph one of the agreement. In
addition, RosettaBooks might also have argued that, if Random House had foreseen
future developments in the publishing industry, it would have included the
qualifying clause, "either now in use or hereafter developed,"' ' after the grant of
rights to "print, publish and sell the work[s] in book form,"" in order to reserve all
future types of book publishing in their name.
The district court in Random House v. Rosetta set forth the correct
standard of
contract interpretation and, in the process of doing so, it adopted the strict approach
to new use analysis. Although the court never specifically addressed the approaches
to new use issues, it inadvertently adopted the strict approach through its analysis
of intent and the determination of ambiguous terms. Following is an analysis of the
elements of the Random House decision.
The Random House court correctly abided by the rule that "[i]nterpretation of
an agreement purporting to grant a copyright license is a matter of state contract
law."'0 7 Under New York law, the contract is to be construed in such a way as to
"give effect" to the intent of the contracting parties.' 8 It is difficult to carry out such
Appellant's Brief, supra note 75, at 13.
'02 See id.
(referencing Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 616).
103 Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 6, Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 283
F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002) (No. 01-7912) [hereinafter Appellee's Brief], available at
http://www.rosettabooks.com/casedocs/RosettaBooks%2BrieP/2Oon%2OAppeal.pdf.
104Id.at 45-46.
"' Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 616.
106 ld.at 614.
107 Flack v. Friends of Queen Catherine Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 526, 536 (2001) (citing
Bourne v. Walt Disney Co., 68 F.3d 621 (2d. Cir. 1995)).
SId.at 536 (citing Terwilliger v. Terwilliger,206 F.3d 240 (2d. Cir. 2000)).
'0'
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a mandate when the terms of the contract are unclear or ambiguous. Under those
circumstances, it is difficult to determine what the true intent of the parties was at
the time they contracted. "Determining whether a contract provision is ambiguous
is a question of law to be decided by the court.""'
In the case of the Random House contracts, the potentially ambiguous term was
the right to "print, publish and sell the work[s] in book form.""' Does "in book
form" refer to the traditional dictionary meaning of "book" identified earlier?"'
Does it refer to a more general ownership of the manuscript?" 2 Or does it refer to
the publishing industry's traditional use of the phrase?"' If it can be resolved that
the term "in book form" carries a "definite and precise meaning, unattended by
danger of misconception in the purport of the [contract] itself, and concerning which
there is no reasonable basis for a difference of opinion,"' 4 then a court may rule that
there is no ambiguity in the phrase. If there is no ambiguity in the phrase "in book
form," then a court may construe the application as a matter of law.
The 1909 Copyright Act defined "books" broadly to include a work regardless
of the way it was bound (e.g., traditional book form, pamphlet, leaflet, etc.)."'
Under the current Copyright Act, the phrase "book form" is not given "as broad a
meaning as that employed for the purpose of the 1909 Act classification of
'book."" 6 Following this reasoning, as introduced in Fieldv. True Comics,"7 fewer
works are considered books just because they take the form of a bound work.
Instead the term "book" is interpreted in the context of the agreement in which it is
used."'
When construing the meaning of "book" as used in the Random House license
agreements, Judge Stein looked to Random House's own Webster's Unabridged
Dictionary for a definition of "book" and found that the definition used therein
refers to "a written or printed work of fiction or nonfiction, usually on sheets of
paper fastened or bound together within covers."' '" As ebooks never take on a paper
"09 Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 618; Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 67
F.3d 435, 443 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that the ambiguity of a writing is a question of law).
"o Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 614 (emphasis added).
Id.
112

Id.

113Id.

Id. at 618 (quoting Breed v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 385 N.E.2d 1280, 1282 (N.Y. 1978)
(citations omitted)).
"15 NIMMER, supra note 3, § 2.04[D][2].
114

16

Id. § 10.14[C].

"' 89 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
...
Id.at 614 ("It is immaterial whether the [work] is classifiable as a book under the
Copyright Act; the question is whether the publication is a publication 'in book form', as the
term is used in the [license] agreement.").
"' Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 620 (quoting RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S
DICTIONARY (2001)).
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form, nor are they "fastened or bound together,"'"2 the "ebook is a book" argument
presented difficulties for Random House. However, as stated earlier, the language
of the agreement is the context within which all terms must be defined.
Random House argued that the definition of "book" cited by the court ignores
qualifying phrases such as "usually on sheets of paper fastened or bound together
within covers;"'' and available alternative definitions as, "such a literary work in
any format."' 22 Under the Random House view, a book is not restricted to a certain
form or medium.' Instead, a book is a literary work that may be presented in any
format, be it a traditional bound paper copy or a digital version.
RosettaBooks argued that Random House attempted to construe "in book form"
in such a way as to gain ownership over the author's words. 2 " The RosettaBooks
argument relied heavily on the use of the term "in book form" in the licensing
agreements. In these agreements, the authors were able to grant and reserve certain
rights to their works. One of the rights necessarily granted in the publishing
agreement was the right to "print, publish and sell the work[s] in book form."' 25
This phrase was used to separate other possible rights such as publication and
distribution of the works by book clubs and in anthologies, Braille, microfilm, audio
books, etc.' 26 RosettaBooks asserted that "book form" as used in the agreements
was meant to refer to trade quality publication of a traditionally bound book, not the
literary work in any format.'27 To support its argument, RosettaBooks evaluated
Random House's own treatment of the terms "book" and "in book form" in their
current licensing and publishing agreements.
In 1990, Random House adopted an "Electronic Rights Clause" '28 which
"explicitly include[s] electronic rights to publication."' 29 The clause states that
"[t]he publisher shall have the right to license publication of the work.., through
microfilm, information storage and retrieval systems, in machine-readable form and
all other non book forms now known or hereafter developed intended to make the
work available in visual form for reading."'30 RosettaBooks contended that use of
this clause by Random House in its current contracts acknowledged that digital
publication and transmission rights, or ebook publication rights, were not granted
by the previous contracts. Furthermore, it argued that Random House explicitly
120

Id.

Appellant's Brief, supra note 75, at 49.
Id. (citing RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY (2000)).
123 Id. at 50.
124 Appellee's Brief, supranote 103, at 9.
121

122

Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 615.
Id.
127 Appellant's Brief, supranote 75, at 49-50.
128 Appellee's Brief, supra note 103, at 27.
129 Id.at 28.
130 Id.at 29.
25

126
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recognized that ebook publication rights are entirely different from the traditional
publication referred to as "in book form." "Machine-readable form"'' employs
different terminology from that originally relied upon and therefore conveys
additional rights.'
RosettaBooks correctly framed the issue of whether an ebook is a book or not.
Examining the term in light of Field v. True Comics, RosettaBooks appropriately
argued that it is not the dictionary meaning of "book" that applies to this case. It is
the meaning of the term as used in the licensing agreements."' The court and
Random House were incorrect in asserting otherwise. Although the court did
eventually reach the same conclusion as RosettaBooks, it failed to recognize that the
definition of "book" in any dictionary is not relevant to the meaning of that word
within the agreements.
Is the phrase "in book form" ambiguous? According to Fieldv. True Comics,
there is no ambiguity in this phrase. The phrase is to be construed within the four
comers of the contract in which it is used.'34 As the contracts at issue are common
form contracts, we have the good fortune of past usage to direct us to the common
construction. The common practice in the publishing industry is to delineate each
right granted to the publisher. 3 Standing alone, the initial grant of rights transfers
only the rights to the traditional publication of a manuscript - nothing more and
nothing less.
Furthermore, the Second Circuit subscribes to a neutral approach to contract
interpretation rather than one biased in favor of the licensor or licensee. 36
What governs.

..

is the language of the contract. If the contract is more

reasonably read to convey one meaning, the party benefitted by that
reading should be able to rely on it; the party seeking exception or
deviation from the meaning reasonably conveyed by the words of the
contract should bear the burden of negotiating for language that would
express the limitation or deviation. This principle favors neither
Id.
2 Id.at 30 ("Random House considered the conveyance of this right to require new and
separate grant language: it was not conveyed by the phrase 'to print, publish and sell the
work in book form,' or else the new language would be surplusage.").
131

...
Id.
at 16-17.
134

Id

'"

See generally BRAD BUNNIN, THE WRITER'S LEGAL COMPANION (3d ed. 1998); TAD

CRAWFORD, THE WRITER'S LEGALGUIDE (1998); JONATHAN KIRSCH, KIRSCH's HANDBOOK
OF PUBLISHING LAW (1995); A. BRUCE STRAUCH, PUBLISHING ANDTHE LAW (2001); DAVID

A. WEINSTEIN, HOW TO PROTECT YOUR CREATIVE WORK: ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT
COPYRIGHT (1996); RICHARD WINCOR, LITERARY RIGHTS CONTRACTS (1979).
36 Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 619 (S.D.N.Y.

2001), af'dpercuriam, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002).
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It follows simply from the words of the

Such an approach to contract interpretation gives effect to the policy
considerations of both contract and copyright law."' By encouraging licensees to
draft effective contracts, competitors are encouraged to seek new methods of
distribution not provided for in, or otherwise exploited by, current contractual
agreements.'39 It also encourages licensees to continue to create new works to fulfill
the demand created by new rights not otherwise protected. 4 In other words, such
a construction provides an ever-expanding market for literary works because no
door is ever shut and the author always retains the claim to new rights. Interpreting
a contract based upon the language within the contract also lends a degree of
predictability to what has come to be regarded as the challenging doctrine of New
Use.

14 1

The Random House court "[relied] on 'the language of the license contract and
143
2
basic principles of interpretation'"' 4 as mandated by Boosey & Hawkes v. Disney
and determined that the "most reasonable interpretation of the grant in the contracts
at issue to 'print, publish and sell the work in book form' does not include the right
to publish the work as an ebook."'4 The secondary contractual clauses Random
House cited in support of its claim are applicable only to those rights specifically
granted by the primary clauses of the contract. 4 The secondary provisions of the
contract are those that provide that the author may not compete with Random
House's publishing of the manuscript and that Random House retains the right to
publish in whatever manner it deems appropriate. Random House argued that these
provisions grant them the right to publish an ebook and prevent the author from
allowing any other party to compete with that right. The reality is that these
secondary clauses only apply to the expressly granted right of Random House to
"print, publish, and sell in bookform." Therefore, unless an ebook was determined
to be "in book form," the non-compete and artistic freedom clauses would not apply
117 Id. at 619 (quoting Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers,Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145
F.3d 481, 487 (2d Cir. 1998)).
138 id.
139

id.

Id.
141 See supra Part 11.
142 Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 620 (quoting Boosey, 145 F.3d at 487 n.3).
113 Boosey, 145 F.3d at 487.
14' Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 620.
141 "Primary clause" refers to the contract's clause entitled "Grant of Rights," which is the
heart and purpose of the contractual agreement. "Secondary clauses" refers to all other
contractual provisions that serve the purpose of enhancing, limiting, or explaining the "Grant
of Rights."
140
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to ebook publication.
Random House argued in its Appellate Brief that the district court misapplied
the favorable precedents established by Boosey and Bartsch.'46 As discussed above,
Boosey and Bartsch found that the new use rights had been granted to the licensee
within the original assignment language. 47 The reasoning for these decisions, in
Random House's analysis, was due to the fact that the new use was not separable
from the use originally considered.' 48 Random House argued thai the new uses
granted in Boosey and Bartschwere so closely related to the originally contemplated
use that they were essentially the same.
The role of the lower court was to determine and apply "the most reasonable
interpretation" of the grant language. 49 The key issue, in Random House's analysis,
was to "identify[] the 'fundamental characteristic' of the grant language . . .
involved.""' The text of the book is the protected right to which Random House
was granted a license.'
"[Therefore,] the physical form in which the [book] is
fixed ... is irrelevant."' 52 The fact that RosettaBooks discovered a different method
of transmitting the text of the book did not create a "new use" and therefore did not
compromise the original grant of rights to "print, publish and sell"' 3 the manuscript
of the author "in book form.' 54 "[T]he essence of a book is not the container in
which it is presented but rather (1)its text, or content, (2) presented in complete,
full-length form, (3) as a reading experience.""' "So long as the work is presented
in 'book' form, Random House owns the exclusive right to publish it."' 56
The second related argument Random House put forth was that, due to the fact
that electronic distribution of the book fell within a reasonable interpretation of the
"print, publish and sell
in book form,"'57 it was the burden of the authors to
exclude "ebooks or new technological modes of delivery" from the license.'58 The
fundamental characteristic of the book, the meaning of "in book form," is the
Appellant's Brief, supra note 75, at 6-9 (citing Boosey, 145 F.3d 481, and Bartsch v.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 826
(1968)).
"" See supra Part I.C.
148 Appellant's Brief, supra note
75, at 6-9.
149 Id.
"0 Id.
at 42.
146

151 Id.

Id.at 43 (quoting Bourne v. Walt Disney Co., 68 F.3d 621, 630 (2d Cir. 1995)).
See HERRON, supra note 83, at 44 (providing copy of standard Random House
publishing contract).
52

153

154

Id.

...Appellant's Brief, supra note 75, at 38.
56 Id.at 39.
157 HERRON, supra note 83, at 44.
"' Appellant's Brief, supra note 75, at 38-39; see also Boosey, 145 F.3d at 486 (relying
on the proposition that the burden of excluding the right to a new use rests on the grantor).
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authors' writings in text form designed for reading." 9 Random House supports the
proposition that Boosey affirmed Bartsch's standard that the burden of granting or
reserving a right falls to the party seeking to depart from a reasonable interpretation
of the grant language."l
RosettaBooks and the district court agreed with the basic Random House
argument that a "reasonable interpretation" of the contract should govern.' 6 As the
contracts enumerated several different granted rights, many of which related to the
forms of publication of the books (e.g., hardcover, softcover, Braille, foreign, etc.),
62
a reasonable interpretation of the language is that ebook rights were not granted.
If they were granted, they would have been enumerated. "The court found that the
expressly enumerated contractual grants would all be rendered superfluous under
Random House's argument, in contravention of ...New York contract law."' 63
RosettaBooks, in its Appellee Brief, offered a detailed analysis of the similarities
between every enumerated right. I" The conclusion of this analysis was that the
rights were so similar to each other that, if they were to include a right equally
6
similar (i.e., the ebook rights), that right would have been enumerated as well.'
RosettaBooks sought to establish that an electronic book is not a book as
understood by the term "in book form."'" It noted the enhancements an ebook
brings to a reading experience, including bookmarking, highlighting, and hyperlinks
to Internet sites. 67 According to RosettaBooks, these technological advances create
a product very different from Random House's traditionally bound "book.' 68 The
differences are much greater between an ebook and a traditional paper book as
compared to the differences between the same paper book and a foreign distributed
or Braille book. The ebook requires mechanical equipment to decipher the code and
deliver the authors' works to the reader.'69 The ebook requires new marketing
channels as well as an entirely different approach to delivery. 70 Therefore, if rights
to publish Braille and foreign distributed books require a separate contractual
's
160
16'

Appellant's Brief, supra note 75, at 42.
Id. at 34-35; see also Boosey, 145 F.3d at 486; Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155.
Appellee's Brief, supra note 103, at 38-39; see also Appellant's Brief, supra note 75,

at 28.

Appellee's Brief, supra note 103, at 5-6 (discussing the language of the contract).
Id. at 6; see also Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 620.
"6See Appellee's Brief, supra note 103, at 5-11.
165 See id.
166 See Dwyer Deposition, supranote 70, at 69-72 (describing the functions unique to the
ebook format).
167 Id
162
163

168 Cf id.

See id
See Declaration of Dorothy Kauffman, Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books
LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (No. 01 CIV. 1728), available at
http://www.rosettabooks.com/casedocs/RB_1 0.pdf.
169

170
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provisions where these forms are so similar to the traditional trade quality book,
most certainly an ebook requires its own grant of rights.
.Beyond this argument, neither RosettaBooks nor the district court embarked on
a detailed examination of the New Use Doctrine as it applies to this case because the
new use analysis is closely related to contract interpretation - the analysis of one
requires consideration of the other. It simply is not efficient or correct to interpret
the grant or reservation of a new use without looking to the structure of the contract.
Bartsch and Boosey are favorable precedents for Random House under any
circumstances other than the modem publishing contract. If not for the ambition of
the attorney, Random House most certainly would have the ebook publication rights.
In these circumstances, Random House was at one time the party most benefited by
the terms of the contract. The author specifically granted each right to them. 7 ' If
ever there were to be a dispute as to the right of Random House to distribute in a
foreign territory or to prevent another publisher from distributing a paperback
version of these works, Random House would win. The contract left no question
as to whether such rights were granted. Unfortunately, in their effort to quell all
ambiguity and create the narrowest of exceptions, Random House found itself
seeking latitude where it had none.'

IV. NEW USE TODAY AND TOMORROW
"Although... new media provide new methods of information distribution, they
also create conflicts over the ownership of the content distributed and represent the
source of publishing's 'most bitter battle in years."" 73 As technology continues to
develop and become more readily available to the consuming public, the problem
over ownership of new media rights will also continue to plague society. 74
'T' See HERRON, supra note 83, at 44 (providing the list of possible publication formats
Random House was permitted to use).
"I Random House appealed the District Court's denial of the motion for preliminary
injunction. Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002). The
appeal was denied and Judge Stein's judgment was affirmed on the grounds that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Id. The court cited New York law
regarding the interpretation of contracts and found that while
there is some appeal to [Random House's] argument that an "ebook" ... is simply
a "form" of a book, and therefore within the coverage of [the] licenses.., the law
of New York, which determines the scope of [the] contracts [at issue], has arguably
adopted a restrictive view of the kinds of "new uses" to which an exclusive license
may apply when the contracting parties do not expressly provide for coverage of
such future forms.
Id. at 491.
'" Rosenzweig, supra note 14, at 900 (quoting Carmody, supra note 14).
114 See id. (recognizing that the problem stems "from a lack of appreciation of future

technologies").
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New use technologies are still considered uncharted territory for courts. As new
technologies develop, demand for change in copyright law generally follows.'75
Electronic publishing is the most recent of these new technologies.' 76 Interpretation
of contracts intended to protect present and possible future rights do not yet receive
consistent treatment within the courts as there is still disagreement regarding the
proper construction of such grants. The goal is to establish certain approaches to
new use issues that will make determination of such cases predictable. Since
Bartsch and Boosey, many courts have applied a hybrid between contract
interpretation and new use construction. This was most apparent in the analysis of
Bourne and Bloom.' Generally, "[c]ourts will first attempt to gauge the parties'
intents; if unable to assess those intents, courts will examine substantive and
procedural unconscionability. If the agreement is not unconscionable in either
manner, courts will determine whether the medium was relatively foreseeable."'7
After the court has made a determination regarding foreseeability, it may conclude
that the grantee receives new use rights for all foreseeable mediums, whereas the
grantor reserves all other rights.'79 The inherent difficulty in applying this analysis,
as discussed above, is that the technology at issue has developed after the
assignment of rights. 80 The result is that an intent to assign such obscure rights is
rarely found.'
As a means of assisting the foreseeability evaluation, Cohen v. Paramount
Pictures Corp. 2 offered the following guidelines: "If the technology was wholly
unforeseeable - if the new medium had not yet been invented - rights are retained
by the grantor."' 83 "But if the technology was invented, though not commercialized,
the rights are granted along with those for the preexisting medium."'8 4 This test
draws a line and declares that, if the technology was invented prior to the contract,
then the right was probably granted unless otherwise unambiguously reserved. If
the technology was not created prior to the contract, "courts... [are] unwilling to
grant licensees the windfall of the rights to use the work in the new medium.' 8 5
The result is that this standard encourages the use of new media by creating flexible
Atteritano, supranote 6, at 390-91.
Id. at 391.
17 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
78. Rosenzweig, supra note 14, at 911.
'"

176

179

Id.

d. at913.
's' Id. at 912-13.
82 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988).
183 Rosenzweig, supra note 14, at 915 (citing Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854) (stating that the
grantee "could not have assumed the public would have free and virtually unlimited access
to the film" and that the "licensee could not have bargained for, or paid for, the rights").
84 Id.(quoting Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 154 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 826 (1968)).
Id. at 919 (citing Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854).
80
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meanings for the originally granted right. 86
The problem this presents for Random House is that the authors, via
RosettaBooks, argued that they did not grant ebook publication rights regardless of
whether they existed at the time of contracting. In the instance of some of the
contracts, ebook publishing did in fact exist.'87
Policy issues strongly favor Bartsch's broad grants to new uses and
future technologies. From a utilitarian standpoint, vesting ownership in
publishers and other licensees rather than in creators results in smaller
transaction costs and facilitates the wider dissemination of information
necessary for the development of new media. Furthermore, such a policy
does not contravene the purpose of the Copyright Act of 1976 ... and
does not work as a disincentive to authorship. 8
Rozenweig argues, and I agree, that the incentives for publication created by the
the Copyright Act of 1976 are not thwarted by the standard set forth above. 89 Each
party seeking the rights at issue had the opportunity to purchase the rights from the
other party.' 90 If it was determined that the rights had been granted to Random
House, RosettaBooks could have purchased the electronic publication rights from
Random House. If the market had determined that Random House could earn no
more by exploiting the rights itself, the license would be of no value and would be
abandoned. Rozenweig continues, stating that "[t]he new-use doctrine is based on
the premise that the future medium was beyond the intentions of the parties; the
author as a result, could not [at the time of the agreement] have expected to profit
from such future medium." '' If the new use had been invented at the time of
contracting, then granting to the licensee the rights to that new use cannot provide
a "disincentive" to the authors. 92 "Clearly, as a matter of policy, it is better to
develop a new medium, allowing the licensee to retain any rights that reasonably can
be said to flow from the contract, than to reward an author with remuneration
beyond her expectations at the expense of the public interest."' 93
186

Id. at 918 (citing

MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 5.10

(1989)).
187 Cf Complaint, supra note 59, para. 36 (claiming that ebook publishing is an extension
of electronic document processing systems of the 1950s and 1960s).
88 Rosenzweig, supranote 14, at 920.
9 Id. at922.
'90 See id (quoting William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 355 (1989) (discussing the transaction costs of
copyright transferral)).
191 Id. at 925.
192

id.

'9' Id. at 926; see alsoBartsch, 391 F.2d at 155. But see, Neil R. Nagano, Comment, Past
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A. New York Times v. Tasini
New York Times Co. v. Tasini 94 is a recent and widely-publicized Supreme
Court case addressing the rights of freelance journalists to maintain control over
their previously published works in the Internet-era. A group of authors filed suit
against the New York Times Company, Newsday, Inc., and Time, Inc. for licensing
the reproduction and distribution of their articles to a variety of electronic
databases.' 95 The authors contended that such distribution and reproduction rights
were not granted by the original contracts entered into with the publishers.' 96 These
contracts only granted the publishers the use of their works in the original
periodicals.'97 The publishers, on the other hand, argued that licensing and delivery
of the works to the electronic databases occurred in bulk; entire issues of the
periodicals were distributed to the databases.' 98 The databases in turn made every
work in that periodical available.'99 Therefore, the distribution and reproduction did
occur within the terms of the contracts.
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, found the publishers' argument
2 00
unpersuasive.
Instead, the Court looked to the realistic operation of the
2
databases. "' The databases did not present the works as an entire periodical. 22
Rather, each database allowed a user to search according to interest and retrieve
documents from a variety of sources and time periods. 0 3 The result was that the
articles were reproduced as individualand independentworks rather than as part of
the collective work. 0 4
The new use question, although not identified as such within the opinion, was
whether a database qualifies as a revision of a collective work. 2 5 Due to the loss of
CopyrightLicenses and the New Video Software Medium, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1160, 1184-85
(1982).
194 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
' The databases include Lexis-Nexis, University Microfilms International, New York
Times OnDisc, and General Periodicals OnDisc. Id. at 490.
196 Id. at 491.
"' See id at 498-99 ("[Ihe Publishers do not here contend the Authors entered into an
agreement authorizing reproduction of the Articles in the Databases.").
'98 Id. at 489.
' See id at 490-91.
200 Id. at 487-88.
201 Id. at 499-501.
202 See id. 500-01.
20 Id. at 500-02.
204 See id. at 500.
20 Id. at 499-504. The Publishers argued that "reproduction and distribution of each
Article by the Databases lie within the privilege of reproducing and distributing the [Articles]
as part of... [a] revision of that collective work." Tasini, 533 U.S. at 499 (quoting 17 U.S.C.
§ 201(c)) (alterations in the original).
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the original format and graphics, and the lack of cohesiveness of the periodical after
it is stored and catalogued by the database, the database versions of the authors'
works did not qualify as revisions of collective works. The importance of this case
to Random House v. RosettaBooks is the emphasis the Court placed on private
contractual arrangements.2 6 Essentially, the Court stated that the interests of all
parties in the publishing industry are best protected by "private contractual
arrangement.""2 7
Contracts are the answer to copyright law. The goal of copyright protection is
not to inhibit new uses for creative works, but instead to encourage them by granting
control to the creators of such works.
B. Greenbergv. National GeographicSociety
Greenbergv. National GeographicSociety?°8 addressed facts similar to those

presented by Tasini. The plaintiff, Greenberg, was a freelance photographer for the
defendant.2 "9 The contractual provisions of this relationship were favorable for
Greenberg as the copyrights to his photographs were reassigned to him after
National Geographic made permissible use of them.210 National Geographic, as part
of its anniversary celebration, developed and distributed a CD-ROM library which
included, in digital format, "every issue of the Magazine from 1888 to 1996."2l
One of these issues included a cover image from Greenberg."' Greenberg alleged,
and the circuit court agreed, that National Geographic had infringed upon his
copyright protection by creating this compilation of works."'
For the purpose of evaluating the potential new use issue, the relevant defense
of National Geographic was that the creation of the CD-ROM consisted only of a
revision of the original collective works in which it had an interest and a right!2 14
This defense mirrors the defense presented by New York Times in Tasini. The
difference, which would appear to be in the interest of National Geographic, was
that the issues were actually presented in their entirety on the CD-ROM."' Unlike
the databases of Tasini where each article or work is categorized and accessible
apart from its original periodical, the photographs here were maintained within the

209

Id. at 505-06.
Id. at 502 n.11.
244 F.3d 1267 (11 th Cir. 2001), cert denied, 534 U.S. 951 (2001).
Id. at 1269.

210

Id.

211

Id.

212

Id

206

207
208

23 Id.at
214Id.at
211

1270, 1275.

1272.
Id at 1269.
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original collective work.216
However, where the holding of Tasini indicated that the copyright infringement
was due to the separation of the articles from their original format and their
presentation as part of a new collective work, the court in Greenbergfound that use
of the photographs as a presentation of the original work on the CD-ROM was also
an infringement upon the artist's copyright.2" 7 The reasoning of the circuit court was
that use of the computer program to create and view the "issues," as well as the
slight adjustments to the plaintiff's photograph, resulted in a derivative work which
was not permitted under the terms of the original contract." 8
The effect of Greenbergon Random House is not as clear as that of Tasini. The
new use at issue in Greenbergwas the same as that presented by Tasini: was the use
of an electronic database of compiled periodicals in accordance with the original
grant of the right to distribute in paper form those same periodicals? According to
Greenberg, it was not. The transition from paper to electronic format created a new
work in which the creator reserved all rights. Under Greenberg,the ebook would
require a separate grant of rights from the author.2t 9 It appears here also that the
language of the contract governs above all other legal principles. And, once again,
the rights of the author are protected over those of the publisher.
Put most succinctly, these opinions make it clear that, without
appropriate written agreements with the . . . authors of a [work, a
licensee] ... cannot claim - or act as if- it owns all rights to those
works. Particularly if only a license to use the work is being obtained,
the opinions in the... cases at issue illustrate the need for grant language
that expressly extends as far as the hiring party believes it does.22 '
It is clear that today's new use cases rely less on notions of copyright policy and
more on the letter and intent of the contracts. Tasini and Greenberg also
demonstrate the likelihood of the Court reserving the rights of authors and creators
to the new uses which may be found in their works.
C. Aftermath of the Random House Decision
" ' arose due to
The debate in Random House v. RosettaBooks22
the fact that the
licensing agreements were entered into prior to the commercialization of ebooks and

Compare Tasini, 533 U.S. at 490, with Greenberg,244 F.3d at 1269.
Compare Tasini 533 U.S. at 503, with Greenberg,244 F.3d at 1275-76.
2' Greenberg,244 F.3d at 1274-76.
219 Id.
220 Linda Pickering & Steven H. Becker, Intellectual Property:Applying the Lessons of
Digital Age Copyright Rulings, 165 N.J.L.J., August 27, 2001.
221 150 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
26
217
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therefore did not contemplate, grant, or reserve such rights. Today, authors have the
opportunity to grant or reserve ebook publication and distribution rights.222 To say
that the authors will suffer overlooks this fact. It also overlooks the fact that these
authors will not be without an ebook licensing agreement; it is only a question of
with which party, their original publisher or an electronic publisher, that agreement
will be.
Were this decision to be overturned, RosettaBooks stands to lose financially
because it has made a sizable investment in the infrastructure required to support
ebook publication, it has invested legal fees in this litigation, and it is promoting
those works currently here at issue. However, these works are not the only works
in which RosettaBooks has built its market. Although there may be many other
works that fall into the same unclear category as those here at issue, based on the
lack of parties joining the suit against RosettaBooks, it seems likely that a majority
of RosettaBooks' selection will remain available, and RosettaBooks will not
necessarily collapse based on the outcome of this trial. In fact, RosettaBooks has
gained a great deal of publicity based on this litigation.223
Contrast this with Random House, which did not make a similar attempt to try
this case before the literary public. This tactic could be the result of Random
House's different (more secure) standing in the world of publishing. Due to this
position, it is likely that the more publicity this case received, the worse it would be
for Random House. As noted earlier, the common perception is that the large
publishing firm has the upper hand, and that the upstart independent publisher
deserves a break. This theory ignores the fact that in this case the small upstart gave
itself a break. RosettaBooks acquired Random House's copies of the Styron,
Vonnegut, and Parker works.224 It then electronically scanned each of Random
House's carefully edited and formatted pages and converted the pages into ebook
format.22
While the copyright violations that may have occurred by these actions are not
the critical issue of Random House or of this Note, they do evidence the hardship
Random House will suffer. Random House invests a great deal of time and capital
in the development, publication, and distribution of the works of its authors.
"Random House spends millions of dollars editing, producing and promoting its
titles, and Rosetta is 'free-riding' on these efforts by offering books for sale in
competition with Random House's sales .... 226 To. permit another publisher to
Appellee's Brief, supra note 103, at 27-31.
Its website makes no efforts to conceal the litigation. A link to all documents can be
found on the home page. See RosettaBooks - Legal, at http://www.rosettabooks.com/
pages/legal.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2003).
...Appellant's Brief, supranote 75, at 20-21; see also Complaint, supra note 59, para. 2.
222
223

225

226

Id.
Random House Sues E-Book Publisherfor Copyright Violations, 12 Sports & Ent.

Litig. Rep. (Andrews Publ'n) No. 12, at 13 (Apr. 2001). "People are unlikely to purchase the
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reap the rewards of such efforts not only fails any "smell test," it also fails to support
the purpose of the Copyright Clause.227 If the holding in this case is never
overturned and remains in favor of RosettaBooks, one hardship to Random House
and other established publishing firms will be that the works in which they invest
may never be fully protected. "The rulings are 'probably right as a legal matter, but
somewhat troubling as a policy matter .... [They] leave[] open the prospect that
lots of deals or assumptions made a long time ago have to be reopened.""'22
There are a variety of ways in which a decision negating the electronic
publishing rights of Random House could affect the publishing industry. However,
each of these should be analyzed in light of the reality of ebooks. The reality is that
ebooks may never generate income substantial enough to recover a publisher's
initial investment. It may be true that the set-up cost of an ebook distribution
channel is minimal compared to that currently required to establish the publication
and distribution process for traditional printed works. Nonetheless there is a set-up
cost in addition to research and marketing expenses. That said, there also does not
appear to be a market large enough to generate any substantial amount of income.
It is quite feasible that Random House may never pursue ebook distribution as
aggressively as intended by RosettaBooks. This does not mean that the terms of the
original contracts between Random House and the authors may be so easily violated.
The result of the final decision in favor of RosettaBooks is that agreements
Random House has with hundreds of authors do not provide Random House with
the rights to distribute and publish the authors' works in electronic format. The
works of these authors are open to competition from not only RosettaBooks, but also
any other publishing house - large or small. This means that Random House is
potentially required to make additional investments in these authors in order to
pursue and obtain the electronic publishing rights.
There are reasons Random House may feel forced to make these investments in
spite of the fact that it does not believe the electronic publishing rights will ever
generate significant revenue. One of these reasons is for the good will of those
authors who are still creating new works. Publishing firms utilize a variety of
resources to develop and maintain strong relationships with their authors. Another
reason is that Random House has an interest in protecting its initial editing and
hardback, paperback or electronic copy of a Random House title if they have already
obtained it from Rosetta, the complaint avers." Id; see alsoComplaint, supranote 59, at 18.
The essence of this argument is that Random House makes the time and labor intensive
investment of developing, editing, and marketing a manuscript while RosettaBooks simply
takes advantage of such efforts without the risk of failure. Random House has already taken
the risk of failure because the works RosettaBooks provides are "classics" or the tried and
true works which make up the backlists of so many well-established publishing firms.
227 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8.
228 Brenda Sandburg, The Final Word?, THE RECORDER (S.F.), July 18, 2001, at I
(quoting Boalt Hall Professor Mark Lemley).
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marketing investments by the least confrontational means possible. It is not likely
that either of these efforts - the editing, marketing, or the end results of such efforts
- are independently copyrightable. Random House may have other intellectual
property rights in its labors, but it is not likely that Random House could pursue or
protect such rights without exercising its potential leverage against the authors and
thereby compromising its goodwill. It is also not feasible for every Random House
contract to be renegotiated or for new licenses granting electronic publishing rights
to be pursued in every case. Some authors are deceased, and, while their work is
still protected for some time to come, the estates of these authors hold the
copyrights. These estates may not have the same interests in the author-publisher
relationship as did the authors. It is likely that, for third parties now faced with this
dilemma, the goal of negotiation will serve a monetary purpose rather than a literary
one.
The result, however, may not be so dire for Random House. If approached by
Random House, many authors may agree to grant the license, no questions asked.
This is due to the fact that many authors do not believe, as Vonnegut himself does
not, that ebooks will ever be a legitimate source of income for them and that they
would rather maintain an amicable relationship with Random House than make a
few extra cents per ebook sale.229 Another factor is that the books currently
published in ebook format are generally short or current novels and instructional
manuals. Random House has such a wide array of literary works licensed to it that
any authors it does lose are not likely to have a dramatic effect on its overall
revenue.
The beneficial impact of the decision in favor of RosettaBooks is that it lends
more predictability to the determination of new use issues. Rather than the intent
of the contract, the language of the contract is the ultimate determining factor. It
appears from the structure of the Random House contract that in fact it was the
language of the contract rather than party intent that governed from the beginning.
By removing the cloud of doubt from the issuance and reservation of rights,
decisions such as these support the policy of the Copyright Clause to promote new
works of art and science. Professor Nimmer's strict approach to new use issues is
the only approach "in which authors would be allowed to benefit from the future
' 230
demand for their work. ,
D. Conclusion
"It is paramount in these cases to further the purpose of copyright23
knowledge and learning in the public interest.", 1
229

See supratext accompanying note 72.
supra note 6, at 403.

230 Atteritano,
231 Id. at 402.

to promote
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Random House v. RosettaBook 232 demonstrates that copyright protection is only
as strong as the contract from which it came. The result of such a position is that the
policy and purposes of the Copyright Clause and the Copyright Act are upheld. If
all unassigned rights are reserved to the author, then a new use is always protected
with the creator of the work. It is a predictable result that does not inhibit authors
from creating new works or making them available to the public.
V. CONTRACT-BASED SOLUTIONS TO THE NEW USE PROBLEM

The uncertainty of new use issues can never be fully eliminated. The nature of
a new use issue is that it applies to future, unknown uses of a work. Therefore, it is
unlikely that any license can address and protect every new use right. However, it
is possible to incorporate certain concepts into the agreement that relay the true
intent of the parties to grant or receive the rights to future new uses. Providing for
the possibility of future uses not yet developed will require a court to at least
acknowledge that the parties intended for the grant of rights to include more than
just those rights presently available. Ideally, a license of publishing rights should
be construed to satisfy the strictest version of the new use analysis - recognizing
only those rights explicitly granted - so as to always be found to protect the
grantee's interest. However, as discussed earlier, the nature of a new use is that it
is unknown, and therefore it is not possible to always explicitly grant such rights."'
There are, however, clauses and provisions that may provide greater protection than
the current new use clauses commonly found in today's publishing contracts.
The current new use clause used in publishing contracts grants publication
'
distribution rights for "means or methods now or hereafter known."234
This is an
open-ended statement that is intended to communicate to a court that the parties
contemplated the future uses for the work, and in so doing, granted the rights to such
uses to the publisher.
Alternatively, some new use provisions protect new uses by reserving in the
publisher certain delineated electronic rights.23 The reason for such an approach is
232
233

Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.

234 MICHAEL

A.

EPSTEIN, MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

12.02[CI[3], at 12-33 (3d

ed. Supp. 2003).
23 See, e.g., POCKET BOOKS, FORM PUBLISHING CONTRACT 19 (on file with author). This
form contract reads:
[The Author grants to the publisher] the sole and exclusive right to use or
adapt, and to authorize others to use or adapt, the Work or any portion
thereof for one or more "electronic versions." As used herein, the term
"electronic versions" shall mean any and all methods of copying,
recording, storage, retrieval, broadcast or transmission of all or any
portion of the Work, alone or in combination with other works, including
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likely that the publisher believes that all new uses for a published work will be based
in an electronic medium.
There are two problems with this approach. The first is simply that the new use
may not be electronic at all, and therefore it will not be protected by the contract
language. The second problem is that the clause is too specific.236 In an effort to
provide for the myriad of potential electronic versions, it is possible that the contract
precludes other versions that simply are not conceivable at this time but also
contrary to the types of electronic versions identified by the contract. This level of
specificity could result in the same issue that arose regarding Random House's
identification of the types of publishing (i.e., softcover, Braille, foreign) that were
protected by the contract - the end result was that the court found that Random
House could not have intended to protect its right to electronic distribution channels
because it was not stated to the same degree of specificity as the other rights.
This Note argues that there is a middle-ground between the two types of new
use provisions that more fully communicate the true intent of the parties to grant or
reserve new use rights. This middle-ground provision can be drafted to protect the
rights and interests of both the author and the publisher. This Note recommends
incorporating into the new use provision certain clauses commonly used throughout
the publishing contract to protect the publisher's interest in new works by the author
and the author's interest in distribution of the current work. The standard publishing
contract contains many forward-looking provisions. This is due to the fact that the
publishing firm invests a great deal of monetary and non-monetary resources in the
development of the author's first work. The publishing firm hopes to recover that
investment from sales of the first work and then to grow the investment from future
works of the author. Therefore, maintaining the rights in an author for the long-term
is a way of protecting that initial investment. The author, on the other hand, has an
interest in ensuring his or her work is distributed to the widest market possible in
order to earn an income from the ensuing royalties. The clauses that follow have as

236

in any multimedia work or electronic book, by any electronic,
electromagnetic or other means not know or hereafter devised including,
without limitation, by analog or digital signal, whether in sequential or
non-sequential order, on any and all physical media now known or
hereafter devised including without limitation, magnetic tape, floppy
disks, interactive CD, CD-ROM, laser disk, optical disk, integrated circuit
card or chip and any other human or machine readable medium, whether
or not permanently affixed in such media, and the broadcast or
transmission thereof by any means now known or hereafter devised, but
excluding audio recording rights, video recording rights and all uses
encompassed in motion picture, television, radio and allied rights
(provided that the exercise of any of the foregoing rights, if reserved
herein by Author or licensed to any third party, shall not preclude the
exercise of the electronic rights).
See, e.g., id.
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their primary goal the protection of future revenue. Incorporating these concepts
into the new use provision is an extension of that same goal.
One provision that would protect both the author's and the publisher's interest
is a right of first refusal, or an option, to all new uses for the work. The right of first
refusal would require the author to approach the publisher with any new uses for the
work. Such a provision would provide that the publisher, if interested in the new
use, has an obligation to negotiate in good faith with the author for the related rights.
A second provision is a broad grant of rights to the publisher for all new use
rights237 limited, however, by the incorporation of a sunset clause. The sunset clause
would acknowledge that the publisher has the right to "print, publish and sell the
work[s] in book form or by any other means or methods now or hereafter known"
but would establish that such an unlimited right expires at a future date with an
option to renew within a certain time frame prior to expiration. This means of
contracting for the new use right protects both the author's and publisher's interest
in the future potential for the work.
A third provision that also provides the author with greater protection is
structuring the broad grant of new use rights to include an obligation of the
publisher to pursue those rights within a certain time frame.238 If a publishing firm
fails to exploit the new use within the established time frame, the new use right
reverts to the author, and he or she may exploit it without breaching the original
publishing license.
Additionally, there are provisions that are solely in the interest of the publisher.
One of these is that "if the licensor [the author] seeks to specifically exclude certain
rights from a license, they should be clearly enumerated. Where a licensor does not
want to grant the right to new uses, the license should include language to that
'
effect."239
This manner of contracting eliminates any ambiguity as to the intent of
the parties to grant or reserve new use rights. It is not fool-proof, however, as there
may still be a debate as to which new use rights were reserved or granted (e.g., is it
just new methods of distribution (via the Internet, for example) that were reserved
to the author but not new methods of presentation (on CD-ROM, for example).
However, it would be the author, as the party putting forth the provision, rather than
the publisher, who would bear the burden of asserting its intent and limitations.
The publisher could also prevent activities such as those of RosettaBooks by
requiring that the author grant to the publisher all rights to the final version
including "all drafts, notes, and other preparatory documents created by the Author,
whether or not such ... documents have actually been physically delivered to the
The broad grant of rights would be similar to the form currently used. See supra note
235 and accompanying text.
238 In the music industry, where this is most frequently used, this type of contract clause
is commonly referred to as a "pay or play provision."
239 EPSTEIN, supra note 234, § 12.02[C][3], at 12-33.
237
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[Publisher]., 24 ° RosettaBooks was able to exploit the works it did by scanning the
final manuscripts into its computer system and transforming them into electronic
versions.
Incorporating this protective clause into the license would prevent any
party from exploiting a new use without a license from the publisher for the final
work, thereby preventing the egregious violation that occurred in this case.
In conclusion, there are myriad ways to enhance the current new use provision
used in the publishing industry that will recognize the intent of the parties and
provide more certainty in the outcome of such disputes as Random House v.
RosettaBooks. The underlying purpose of each of these suggestions is to promote
communication between author and publisher. The result of this communication is
to further develop that sacred relationship each party relies on so strongly.

VI. UPDATE
At the time of this Note's publication, Random House, Inc. and RosettaBooks
LLC have settled their litigation and entered into a licensing agreement for ebook
rights.242 The final arrangement provides that "RosettaBooks will pay an advance
and a royalty to the authors and the publisher, much as a paperback publisher or
'
audio book publisher compensates these parties for a license."243
Furthermore, the
license also utilizes the sunset clause and renewal option discussed above:2" "Each
electronic license will be for three years, with RosettaBooks having the option to
renew for an additional three years., 245 Random House, therefore, has not entirely
foregone its potential to market its works as ebooks. Rather, it is has taken
advantage of the ability to receive a portion of the revenue from whatever sales are
made without investing the resources necessary to exploit the use. As stated by
Arthur Klebanoff, CEO of RosettaBooks, "This licensing program is a win for
authors, publishers, and the growing audience for e-book reading. We expect this
relationship will set the model for the entire trade publishing industry. 46
Megan M Gillespie

240 1 JOHN W. HAZARD, COPYRIGHT LAW IN BUSINESS AND PRACTICE 2002, § 10:20, at

10-20.

Appellant's Brief, supra note 75, at 20-21.
Press Release, RosettaBooks, Random House, Inc. & RosettaBooks LLC Settle
Litigation & Set E-Book Licensing Alliance (Dec. 4, 2002), available at
24
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http://www.rosettabooks.com/pages/RBRHRelease.html.
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